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CALCULATING JUDGMENT INTEREST AFTER 




Until recently, compound judgment interest was only available in rare 
circumstances, namely where courts exercised their equitable jurisdic-
tion.  Simple interest was the ordinary measure awarded by the courts. 
However, in Bank of America Canada v. Mutual Trust Co. the Supreme 
Court of Canada stunned Canadaʼ’s legal theorists and practitioners by 
holding that compound judgment interest could be awarded at common 
law.  It was the firm belief of Major J. that such relief was necessary to 
protect the full time value of money owed to judgment creditors.  
This paper considers the hidden implications of the decision.  Attention 
is given to the Supreme Court of Canadaʼ’s ambiguous use of restitu-
tion principles in awarding compound interest.  The context of the case 
suggests that the Court was possibly referring to disgorgement, a type 
of restitution.  However, neither the terminology used, nor the circum-
stances of the case clarify whether this was the Courtʼ’s true intention. 
Additionally, Major J. decided to limit the use of restitution principles 
in cases of contract breach (where it traditionally was unavailable) to 
those involving inefficient breaches.  The uncertainly with regard to 
the extent of this limit is examined.  Finally, consideration is given to 
the possibility of contract rights attaining the status of property rights 
through the Courtʼ’s apparent use of disgorgement principles.
† Geoffrey Robert Cobham, B.A.(Hons.), J.D., is an Articling Student at Mills & Mills LLP in 
Toronto.  The author wishes to thank Erin M. Metzler for all of her support and assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Bank of America Canada v. Mutual Trust Co.,1 the Supreme Court of 
Canada made two surprising decisions. First, it held that there is a com-
mon law power to award compound rates on pre-judgment and post-
judgment interest. Second, the Court may have decided that restitution 
principles are applicable in a claim for damages for breach of contract.
The facts in Bank of America are as follows: 
In 1987 Reemark Sterling I Ltd. (“Reemark”) decided to develop 
condominium units. The respondent Mutual Trust Company (“Mutual 
Trust”) negotiated with Reemark to create a Takeout Mortgage Com-
mitment Agreement (“TOC”) on December 1, 1987. According to the 
terms of the TOC, Mutual Trust agreed to provide mortgage financing to 
investors who wished to purchase the Reemark condominiums. On the 
sale of a unit, the purchase funds were to be sent directly from Mutual 
Trust to Reemark. Mutual Trust was to collect payments from the inves-
tors with interest compounded semi-annually. On December 1, 1988, 
Bank of America Canada (“Bank of America”) agreed to finance the 
cost of Reemarkʼ’s development and entered a loan agreement with Ree-
mark. The interest on this loan was compounded monthly at Bank of 
Americaʼ’s prime lending rate plus one percent. On December 16, 1988, 
Bank of America, Mutual Trust and Reemark executed an assignment 
of the TOC. The terms of the assignment incorporated the loan agree-
ment dated December 1, 1988, and directed Mutual Trust to pay Bank of 
America directly, following the sale of a Reemark condominium unit.
On July 31, 1991, Mutual Trust breached the TOC. Negotiations en-
sued between the three parties and on December 18, 1991, an amended 
TOC was created (“ATOC”). Mutual Trust subsequently breached the 
ATOC as well. Bank of America then appointed a receiver and had the 
development sold for $22,500,000. However, Remark still owed Bank 
of America for the difference of the $33,000,000 that was originally 
advanced to Reemark under the loan agreement. As a result, Bank of 
America pursued the deficiency and claimed damages for breach of con-
tract under the TOC, the assigned TOC and the ATOC. At trial, damages 
were awarded with compound interest at the prescribed rate in the loan 
agreement. The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the measure of dam-
1 2002 CarswellOnt 1114 [Bank of America].
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ages but substituted an award of simple interest. The Supreme Court of 
Canada restored the trial award of compound interest.
Traditionally, compound interest on judgment awards was only 
granted where a court exercised its equitable jurisdiction in cases in-
volving breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and expropria-
tion. The object of awarding compound interest in these circumstances 
was to compensate the plaintiff in full. Speaking for the Supreme Court 
of Canada, Major J. held that the need to compensate fully for the time 
value of judgment awards should not be restricted to the traditional cat-
egories; Major J. decided to make what he described as an incremental 
change to the common law by creating a common law power to award 
compound interest on judgment awards. It is now no longer necessary 
to invoke a courtʼ’s equitable jurisdiction in order to obtain compound 
interest on a judgment award.
In changing the common law, Major J. relied on compensatory prin-
ciples as well as principles of restitution. The use of restitution principles 
was unnecessary. Compensatory principles alone could have obtained 
the same result. The following will demonstrate that Major J. was in fact 
using restitution principles in the sense of “disgorgement of profits” in 
order to make his change to the common law appear less drastic. 
Disgorgement, a type of restitutionary remedy, has traditionally been 
available in cases involving a plaintiffʼ’s proprietary interests. Implicit in 
Major J.ʼ’s judgment is his reliance on the availability of disgorgement 
of profits where the proprietary interests of a plaintiff are involved. The 
proprietary interest at issue in Bank of America was the debt owed by 
Mutual Trust to Bank of America. Specific performance is available as a 
matter of course in actions to recover a debt and the availability of spe-
cific performance is akin to a proprietary interest. Major J. effectively 
disguised the disgorgement of profits in an action involving proprietary 
interests by awarding compound interest. Since disgorgement of profits 
has been available for actions for breach of contract involving propri-
etary interests, and there was a proprietary interest at issue in Bank of 
America, Major Jʼ’s decision to award compound interest at common 
law as a disgorgement of profits seems less drastic in nature. His award 
of compound interest can be said to have disgorged any profit made by 
Mutual Trust by retaining the funds owed to Bank of America. 
In implicitly utilizing restitution principles in an action for breach 
of contract, Major J. seems to have realised that he might appear to 
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be simultaneously making restitution generally available in actions for 
breach of contract. This was not his intention; he merely wanted to use 
disgorgement principles as a vehicle to ease the transition to allow-
ing compound interest at common law. He was concerned, and rightly 
so, that by making restitution readily available in actions for breach 
of contract, he could eliminate the distinction between contract rights 
and property rights. To protect that distinction, Major J. placed a limit 
on the availability of restitution in contract by limiting it to cases in-
volving non-efficient breaches. In so doing, he made the availability of 
restitution possibly redundant,2 as compensatory principles alone would 
suffice in cases where there is no efficient breach. This redundancy sup-
ports the view that Major J.ʼ’s use of restitution principles was premised 
solely on the desire to make the change to the common law appear in-
cremental.
However, Major J.ʼ’s decision to restrict restitution to cases involv-
ing non-efficient breach may not be interpreted so narrowly by judges 
in future cases. In fact, in Bank of America the Court applied restitu-
tion principles in a factual situation that involved an efficient breach. 
Since Mutual Trustʼ’s breach did not fall within the traditional categories 
wherein compound interest was regularly awarded, Mutual Trust may 
have relied on the existing law, prior to Bank of America, as authority 
limiting it to the payment of simple interest on any judgment award ob-
tained by Bank of America. In addition, the Supreme Court stated that 
efficient breach should not be discouraged, not that it must not be dis-
couraged. Hence, it is plausible that judges will interpret Bank of Ameri-
ca as simply setting out a general principle that ordinarily restricts resti-
tution to cases of inefficient breach, thereby making restitution available 
in claims for damages for breach of contract in some instances where 
an efficient breach is present. This would be an extraordinary change, 
as restitution in the sense of unjust enrichment has not previously been 
available in claims for damages for breach of contract. Further, the Su-
preme Courtʼ’s use of the term “restitution” is ambiguous. The facts and 
the nature of the cause of action suggest that “disgorgement” was the 
intended meaning. This is so not only because of the Courtʼ’s implicit 
reliance on the proprietary interest at issue, but also due to the fact that 
2 McInnes, infra note 112 at 132.
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the claim was for breach of contract. This ambiguity could result in ad-
ditional confusion when Bank of America is applied to future cases.
To date, courts have fortunately been applying the Bank of Ameri-
ca decision based on its compensatory principles alone. However, the 
ambiguities in the case leave open the possibility for future decisions 
to allow claims for restitution for simple breach of contract actions. 
This would be unfortunate as the distinction between contract rights 
and property rights would thereby be diminished, especially if the term 
“restitution” is used in the sense of disgorgement of profits. Allowing 
disgorgement for a simple breach of contract, where the expectation 
measure is the traditional measure of damages, could have the effect of 
making such a claim specifically enforceable. Efficient breaches would 
no longer be possible. Breaching parties would always be forced to re-
turn gains made by a breach, even where the plaintiff was already fully 
compensated. This would have a punitive effect on breaching parties, 
as non-breaching parties would be able to extort from them the antici-
pated cost of performance, as opposed to its value, upon breach. In other 
words, a non-breaching party would be able to obtain more than full 
compensation for the effects of a breach. 
The possible consequences of his decision reveal that Major J. was 
making more than a mere “incremental change” to the common law. It 
is true that the main purpose of expectation damages is to compensate a 
plaintiff in full, and in that sense he was correct to endorse the doctrine 
of efficient breach. However, an ancillary character of the expectation 
damages rule is that it prevents profit from breach. The same result could 
have been achieved by compensatory principles alone, and the Court 
could have avoided the ambiguities flowing from its use of restitution-
ary principles. It is indeed true that by using compensatory principles 
alone it would no longer be open for the Court to rely on disgorgement 
principles as a method to change the common law incrementally. This 
may, however, have been the sort of change which is best left provincial 
legislatures. The provinces had enacted legislation that set out a rule 
which generally allowed simple interest on judgment awards. The re-
sulting compensation for plaintiffs may have been less than perfect us-
ing simple interest, but at least the law was certain. Often all that can be 
achieved by lawmakers is an imperfect but predictable rule. The proper 
role of a court is not to attempt to legislate a more perfect rule; rather, 
this demands proper legislative reform.
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II. AVAILABILITY OF COMPOUND RATES FOR PRE-JUDGMENT 
AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST
In Bank of America, the Supreme Court of Canada broke from the tradi-
tional view that compound interest is unavailable on pre-judgment and 
post-judgment interest. In this case, the Court examined the circum-
stances under which judgment interest is available pursuant to the On-
tario Courts of Justice Act.3 While s. 128(1) permits awarding pre-judg-
ment interest, s. 128(4)(b) indicates that “interest shall not be awarded 
under subsection (1) on interest accruing under this section.” Prior to 
Bank of America, it was commonly thought that such wording preclud-
ed awards of compound interest on judgments. The CJA also provides 
for post-judgment interest in s. 129(1), which states that “money ow-
ing under an order, including costs to be assessed or costs fixed by the 
Court, bears interest at the post-judgment interest rate, calculated from 
the date of the order.” With regard to post-judgment interest, there is no 
provision analogous to s. 128(4)(b).
At the trial level of Bank of America, Justice Farley relied on s. 130 
of the CJA in granting compound interest for the pre-judgment and post-
judgment periods.4 In awarding interest on judgments, a court is given 
considerable discretion by s. 130(1), which reads:
The Court may, where it considers it just to do so, in respect of the 
whole or any part of the amount on which interest is payable under 
section 128 or 129,
(a) disallow interest under either section;
(b) allow interest at a rate higher or lower than that provided in 
either section;
(c) allow interest for a period other than that provided in either 
section.
In exercising its discretion under s. 130(1), a court may examine a host 
of factors set out in s. 130(2), including any considerations that it deems 
relevant.5
3 R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43.
4 [1998] O.J. No. 1525 (QL).
5 Courts of Justice Act, supra note 3, s.130(g). 
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The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judgment but reversed 
Justice Farleyʼ’s decision to award compound interest.6 Justice Goudge 
held that s. 130 did not allow for the awarding of compound interest.7 
He felt that compound interest could only be awarded using the Courtʼ’s 
equitable jurisdiction, as such jurisdiction was the sort of “right” con-
templated by s. 128(4)(g) and s. 129(5).8 Dealing with pre-judgment 
interest, s. 128(4)(g) states that “interest shall not be awarded under 
subsection (1), where interest is payable by a right other than under this 
section.” With regard to post-judgment interest, s. 129(5) reads “inter-
est shall not be awarded under this section where interest is payable by 
a right other than under this section.”9 Justice Goudgeʼ’s decision was 
consistent with the law as it stood to that point. In considering the Su-
preme Courtʼ’s reasoning in awarding compound interest at common law 
it is helpful to understand the circumstances in which compound inter-
est was traditionally available. Once the common law as it traditionally 
stood is examined, it becomes apparent why Justice Major thought that 
it was too restrictive.
1. Traditional Grounds for Granting Compound Interest on 
Judgment Awards
Traditionally, compound interest was only available in cases involv-
ing breaches of fiduciary duty, fraud, and expropriation. In Harrison 
v. Mathieson,10 it was held that compound interest could be awarded 
when a fiduciary or trustee who had a duty to invest entrusted monies 
breached a fiduciary obligation. Meredith C.J.O. held that it was:
proper to take the account with annual rests, for the reason that… 
it was the duty of the trustee to have invested the money which 
he misapplied; and, if he had done so, the investment would have 
produced five per cent compound interest.11 
6 [2000] O.J. No. 704 (QL).
7 Ibid. at para 55.
8 Ibid. at para 49.
9 Courts of Justice Act, supra note 3.
10 (1916), 30 D.L.R. 150 (Ont. S.C.A.D.).
11 Ibid. at 158.
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This line of reasoning was endorsed in Wallersteiner v. Moir,12 which 
involved a company director who misused company funds for his own 
benefit in his fiduciary capacity. Buckley L.J. held that “ it is well es-
tablished in equity that a trustee who in breach of trust misapplies trust 
funds will be liable not only to replace the misapplied principal fund 
but to do so with interest from the date of the misapplication.”13 The 
rationale for such a holding was that such a trustee is presumed to have 
retained the trust funds and to have used them for his own purposes.14 
Buckley L.J. went on to say “where a trustee has retained trust money in 
his own hands, he will be accountable for the profit which he has made 
or which he is assumed to have made from the use of the money.”15 
A defaulting trustee will be accountable for simple interest only, but 
where a trustee uses trust funds in trade he may be charged compound 
interest. Buckley L.J. indicates that the justification for charging com-
pound interest in such instances “lies in the fact that profits earned in 
trade would likely be used as working capital for earning further prof-
its.”16 It was further posited that in commercial transactions involving 
misappropriated trust funds, a court should presume that the transaction 
was profitable for the trustee absent evidence to the contrary.17 Hence, 
there is no need to prove any actual profit being made where trust funds 
are inappropriately used in commercial transactions by the trustee; prof-
it will be imputed. In Wallersteiner, the director was presumed to have 
made a profit when he used company funds in commercial transactions 
and was ordered to pay compound interest. 
Denning M.R., as he then was, agreed with Buckley L.J. that com-
pound interest should have been awarded in the circumstances. Denning 
M.R. stated that it is to be presumed that:
the company (had it not been deprived of the money) would have 
made the most beneficial use open to it… . Alternatively, it should 
be presumed that the wrongdoer made the most beneficial use of it. 
But, whichever it is, in order to give adequate compensation, the 
12 [1975] 1 All E.R. 849 (C.A.) [Wallersteiner].
13 Ibid. at 863.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid. Buckley L.J. also held that this presumption applied to agents who retained monies of 
their principals.
17 Ibid. at 864.
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money should be replaced with interest yearly rests, i.e. compound 
interest.18
In addition to positing a presumption that a trustee makes a profit from 
the use of misappropriated trust funds, Denning M.R. makes it clear that 
the awarding of compound interest is based on compensatory principles. 
This is evidenced by the passage above wherein Denning M.R. states 
to “give adequate compensation,” and by his statement that a “mere 
replacement of money – years later – is by no means adequate compen-
sation, especially in days of inflation.”19 Since inflation is an ongoing 
process, it would be reasonable to argue that compound interest will 
always be necessary to compensate in such situations. This logic seems 
to be inherent in Justice Majorʼ’s decision.
The principles enunciated in Wallersteiner have been followed in 
Ontario on numerous occasions. Brock v. Cole20 was the first case ex-
pressly to follow Wallersteiner. The plaintiff in Brock advanced $20,000 
on February 11, 1974 to his solicitors. The solicitors were supposed to 
use the money to enable their company to purchase land appraised at 
$40,000 as mortgagors, and were to deliver a first mortgage to the plain-
tiff as mortgagee. The mortgage was to be for a term of three months, 
with interest accruing at eighteen percent. As of August 1974, the plain-
tiff had yet to hear from his solicitors regarding the transaction. In Octo-
ber 1974, the plaintiff received a firm trust cheque for $3,095 for interest 
on his outstanding funds. Later in the same month he finally received a 
second mortgage, instead of a first as was initially agreed, on a property 
that was bought for only $16,000. The property was eventually sold, but 
the plaintiff never received more than the $3,095 firm trust cheque.
Thorson J.A. held that the plaintiff was entitled to compound inter-
est on $20,000 at ten percent per annum from May 11, 1974 onwards. 
In coming to its decision, the Court of Appeal considered s. 36(5) of the 
Judicature Act.21 Paragraphs 36(5)(b) and s. 36(5)(f) of the Judicature 
Act are identical to paragraphs 128(4)(b) and s. 128(4)(g) of the Courts 
of Justice Act. Thorson J.A. held that s. 36(5)(f) constitutes a statutory 
recognition that rights to interest on judgment claims that are found out-
18 Wallersteiner, supra note 12 at 856.
19 Wallersteiner, supra note 12 at 856.
20 (1983), 142 D.L.R. (3d) 461 (C.A.) [Brock].
21 R.S.O. 1980, c. 223.
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side the general provisions of s. 36 of the Judicature Act continue to 
exist.22 Further, it was noted that nothing in s. 36 demonstrates a legisla-
tive intent to abrogate the authority of a court, applying well-recognized 
principles of equity, to award compound interest in cases in which it 
is just and proper to do so.23 Compound interest is available in cases 
where trustees fail to invest entrusted money as instructed, and thereby 
earn compound interest, and also in cases where money is wrongfully 
detained when it ought to have been paid.24
There was some discussion in Brock that the wording “payable by a 
right other than under this section” precluded the equitable application 
of compound interest. It was suggested that equitable remedies do not 
constitute “rights,” as courts always have discretion to refrain from ap-
plying equitable remedies.25 Thorson J.A. felt that such an interpretation 
would place too narrow a meaning on the word “right”, “if on the facts 
before the Court no reasons or ground has been advanced upon which 
the Court, acting judicially, could properly refuse such an order.”26
The Court went on to adopt the reasoning of Buckley L.J. and Den-
ning M.R. in Wallersteiner, and held that the defendant could be pre-
sumed to have earned compound interest in using the plaintiffʼ’s funds 
in the course of its real estate ventures. Similar to Denning M.R. in 
Wallersteiner, Thorson J.A. emphasized that the plaintiff would not be 
adequately compensated by an award of simple interest.27 Hence, the 
plaintiff was entitled to compounded judgment interest from May 11, 
1974 onwards.
The Brock decision was followed in Claiborne Industries Ltd. v. 
National Bank of Canada,28 and most recently in Confederation Life 
Insurance Co. v. Shepherd, McKenzie, Plaxton, Little & Jenkins.29 Clai-
borne was an action brought for breach of trust, and for conspiracy. In 
awarding compound interest, the Court adopted the principles set out in 
Brock indicating that: 
22 Brock, supra note 20 at 466.
23 Brock, supra note 20 at 467.
24 Brock, supra note 20 at 467.
25 Iaccobucci J. notes, in Air Canada v. LCBO, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 581 at para. 86, that the awarding 
of compound interest is discretionary.
26 Brock, supra note 20 at 466.
27 Brock, supra note 20 at 469.
28 1989 CarswellOnt 1425 (C.A.) [Claiborne].
29 (1996) 88 O.A.C. 398 (Ont. C.A.) [Confederation].
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a right other than under this sectionʼ’ [in s.36(5)(f) of the Judicature 
Act] included the general jurisdiction of the Court to award compound 
interest where there is a wrongful detention of money which ought to 
have been paid. This is on the theory that it is reasonable to assume 
that the wrongdoer made the most beneficial use of the money and 
is accountable for the profits. A reasonable use of money implies 
compounding interest at some appropriate interval.30
In Confederation, the Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the princi-
ples put forth in Brock, but distinguished it on the facts.
Compound interest is regularly awarded in equity with respect to 
cases dealing with expropriation. In British Pacific Properties Ltd. v. 
British Columbia (Minister of Highways & Public Works),31 the Su-
preme Court of Canada upheld a compound interest award made by an 
arbitrator. The case revolved around a narrow interpretation of s. 3 of 
the Federal Interest Act,32 which purported to fix interest rates at five 
percent “whenever any interest is payable by agreement or parties or 
by law, and no rate is fixed by such an agreement or by law.” Laskin 
C.J.C. held that an award of interest at a specified rate made by arbitra-
tors in fixing compensation for expropriated land pursuant to a statutory 
authority is payable by law and escapes the limitations of s. 3 of the 
Interest Act.33 
Similar to instances of breach of trust or fiduciary duties, the purpose 
of granting compound interest in cases of expropriation is to compensate 
fully the landowner who has lost the value of his or her land. In Man-
nix v. The Queen,34 the Alberta Court of Appeal stated that compound 
interest is appropriate in cases of expropriation, because the landowner 
is entitled to be compensated so as to be left economically whole.35 The 
Court further held on the facts of the case it could be expected that 
the landowner would have followed prudent investment practices had 
the money been available, and would have invested at investorʼ’s rates, 
rather than at lower borrowerʼ’s rates.36 Again there is a presumption that 
30 Claiborne, supra note 28 at para. 166.
311980 CarswellBC 575 (S.C.C.)[British Pacific Properties].
32 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-15.
33 British Pacific Properties, supra note 31 at para. 10.
34 [1984] A.J. No. 722 (C.A.) (QL) [Mannix].
35 Ibid. at para. 13.
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the person kept out of funds would have made the best available use of 
those funds had they been promptly available.
Finally, it should be noted that compound interest has been available 
in some cases not involving equitable remedies for breach of trust, fraud 
or expropriation. For example, in Roman Catholic Diocese of Calgary 
Association for Seniors v. Century Insurance,37 a dispute arose between 
the insured plaintiff and the insurer as to whether or not a fire insurance 
policy had lapsed. In finding that the policy had not lapsed, the Court 
held that the insured was entitled to compound interest on the insurance 
proceeds equal to the amount the insured would have earned had it been 
able to deposit the proceeds in an existing term deposit which was com-
pounded monthly.38 The Court felt that the plaintiff had proved that it 
regularly deposited funds into a term deposit during the time it was kept 
out of the insurance proceeds, and presumed that the plaintiff would 
have invested the proceeds in the same account had they been promptly 
available. Hence, in cases not involving breach of trust, breach of fiduci-
ary duty, or expropriation, a plaintiff may be entitled to compound inter-
est if he or she can prove that money withheld by the defendant would 
otherwise have been invested at a compound rate.
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, there is ample authority to 
support an award of compound interest in equity for breach of trust or 
breach of fiduciary duty, expropriation and in cases where a plaintiff 
has been kept out of money rightfully due that would have otherwise 
been invested at compound rates. While compound interest was readily 
available in such cases, it was not traditionally available at common law 
prior to Bank of America.
The traditional position of refusing awards of compound interest 
at common law was adopted by the House of Lords in Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council.39 Speak-
36 Ibid. at para. 14.
37 (1984) 8 D.L.R. (4th) 435 (Alta. C.A.).
38 Ibid. at 441.
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ing for the majority, Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that in the absence 
of fraud, compound interest has never been awarded except against a 
trustee or other person owing a fiduciary duty who is accountable for 
profits made from his position.40 The award of compound interest was 
restricted to cases where the award was in lieu of an account of profits 
made improperly by the trustee.41 Since there was no trust or fiduci-
ary relationship between the bank and the borough, compound interest 
could not be awarded. Lord Browne-Wilkinson went on to state that 
Parliament expressly forbid the awarding of compound interest in the 
Supreme Court Act, 1981. However, the Act did not impinge on the 
awarding of interest in equity. He forcefully stated that:
your Lordships would be usurping the function of Parliament if, by 
expanding the equitable rules for the award of compound interest, 
this House were now to hold that the Court exercising its equitable 
jurisdiction in aid of the common law can award compound interest 
which the statutes have expressly not authorized the Court to award 
in exercise of its common law jurisdiction.42
Both Lord Slynn of Hadley43 and Lord Lloyd of Berwick44 agreed that 
creating a common law power to award compounded judgment interest 
would usurp the function of Parliament, and that legislative reform was 
needed if there was to be any change.
Given the state of authorities leading up to the Supreme Courtʼ’s de-
cision in Bank of America, it is apparent that the Ontario Court of Ap-
39 [1996] H.L.J. No. 15 (QL) [Westdeutsche]. The case involved an interest rate swap agree-
ment between a bank and the Islington London Borough Council. Such agreements are in effect 
wagers, where one party agrees to pay interest at a fixed rate on a notional capital sum over a 
fixed period, while the other party agrees to pay a floating rate of interest calculated by market 
rates on the same sum over the same period. No payment is actually made until the end of the 
stipulated period, where the unsuccessful party pays the difference between the two results. 
However, the bank made an upfront payment of £2,500,000 to the borough. The agreement 
was an attractive way for the borough to raise some additional capital while avoiding statutory 
controls. However, such agreements were ultra vires the borough. The bank paid £1,354,474 on 
the agreement. At trial, the borough was ordered to pay £1,145,526, which amounted to the bal-
ance of the £2,500,000 originally put up front. The borough did not object to paying the amount 
ordered, but did appeal the award of compound interest.
40 Ibid. at para. 69.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid. at para. 129.
43 Ibid. at paras. 135, 137.
44 Ibid. at paras. 202, 206.
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peal decision was consistent with precedent. Further, the clear wording 
of s. 128(4)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act seemed to prevent an award 
of compound interest at common law. Hence, in similar fashion to the 
House of Lords decision in Westdeutsche, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
was reluctant to usurp the function of the legislature by stretching the 
meaning of the Courts of Justice Act. This leads one to ask why the 
Supreme Court of Canada would reverse a decision that was consistent 
with precedent? 
The Supreme Courtʼ’s decision is correctly premised on the compen-
satory nature of compound interest as discussed by Denning M.R. in 
Wallersteiner and in subsequent cases. Compound interest was awarded 
as a method of ensuring full compensation for the plaintiff. It provides 
the plaintiff the full time value of the money owed to him. Major J. 
simply did not think that it was appropriate to limit full compensation to 
cases invoking the equitable jurisdiction of the Court. To adhere to such 
a restriction effectively prevents full compensation in other cases. The 
time value of money is always affected in any judgment award, regard-
less of whether a courtʼ’s equitable jurisdiction is exercised. 
Several commentators have argued that there was no principled ba-
sis to restrict the awarding of compound interest.45 The refusal to award 
compound interest keeps the plaintiff out of money that is properly due 
at the date of the wrong, which the plaintiff could have in turn invested 
at compound rates.46 Mary Anne Waldron, in The Law of Interest in 
Canada, notes that the primary reason for excluding compound interest 
has been that it was considered too difficult to calculate. She argues, 
however, that 
since commercial practice virtually without exception compounds 
interest, and considering the substantial difference that compounding 
can make in time of high rates and slow litigation, no rationale 
remains for prohibiting compound interest.47  
It is no longer the case that it is too difficult to calculate compound in-
terest.
45 S.M. Waddams, The Law of Damages, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1997) at 437 [The 
Law of Damages]. Mary Anne Waldron, The Law of Interest in Canada, (Toronto: Carswell, 
1992) at 142 [Law of Interest].
46 The Law of Damages, ibid. at 437.
47 The Law of Interest in Canada, supra note 45 at 142.
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The Supreme Court of Canada in Bank of America was cognizant 
of the unfairness of limiting compound interest to courtsʼ’ equitable ju-
risdiction, and of the fact that it is no longer too difficult to calculate 
compound interest.48 The Court held that it no longer makes sense to 
limit compound interest to cases involving equitable principles. Major 
J. realised that the full measure of expectation damages for breach of 
contract cannot not be achieved if compound interest is limited to the 
Courtʼ’s equitable jurisdiction. Full compensation is not awarded if a 
plaintiff is limited to receiving simple interest on a judgment award, as 
the plaintiff does not receive the full time value of the principal sum of 
the award.49 Hence, Major J. strayed from precedent and the clear word-
ing of the Courts of Justice Act to create a common law power permit-
ting the awarding of both pre-judgement and post-judgment compound 
interest. In doing so, Major J. correctly used compensatory principles 
for the reasons set out above. He also, however, remarkably used res-
titution principles to support his decision, even though the case was 
premised on an action for breach of contract. Restitution for an unjust 
enrichment was traditionally not available where a plaintiff claims dam-
ages for breach of contract. 
While the change to the common law to allow compound interest is 
desirable so as to compensate the plaintiff in full, the change could have 
been made solely on compensatory principles; anything further would 
have been best left to the legislature. The references to restitution were 
most likely used to ease the transition to allowing compound interest at 
common law; in other words, the restitution analysis assisted Major J. 
to make the transition appear to be an “incremental change.” Compound 
interest can be viewed as similar to a disgorgement of profits if the plain-
tiff is awarded the actual compound interest made by the defendant on 
the money that is rightfully due to the plaintiff. Disgorgement of profits, 
a type of restitution remedy, has been awarded in cases where plaintiffs 
have sought damages for breach of contract where proprietary interests 
were involved. The plaintiff in Bank of America was suing in breach of 
contract over the non-payment of a debt. An action on a debt entitles a 
plaintiff to specific performance as a matter of course, not as of right.50 
48 Bank of America, supra note 1 at para. 44.
49 Bank of America, supra note 1 at para. 23.
50 The Law of Damages, supra note 45 at 122.
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Since specific performance is available as a matter of course for a debt 
owed, it can be argued to be akin to a proprietary right in the sense that 
the plaintiff is generally entitled to the actual debt owed. Since a rem-
edy in specific performance is in effect proprietary in nature, it could 
be argued that the issue in dispute in Bank of America was proprietary. 
Hence, in this light, using disgorgement principles to award compound 
interest assists Justice Majorʼ’s claim that he was making an incremental 
change to the common law.51 Implicit in Major J.ʼ’s reasoning is that 
he was merely allowing a disgorgement of profits in a claim involving 
proprietary interests – the disgorgement being the shifting of compound 
interest, presumably earned by Mutual Trust, to Bank of America.
As will be discussed below, the reference to restitution principles 
in awarding compound interest was unnecessary and creates problems 
which are difficult to resolve. In order to understand better Major J.ʼ’s 
use of restitution principles in an action for breach of contract, it will be 
helpful to address the availability of restitution in contract prior to Bank 
of America. 
III. RESTITUTION IN A CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT?
1. Expectation Damages, Reliance Damages and Specific 
Performance
In Bank of America, the plaintiff claimed damages for breach of con-
tract. The usual measure of damages in breach of contract is the expec-
tation measure. As Parke B. held in Robinson v. Harman: 
the rule of the common law is, that where a party sustains a loss by 
reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to 
be placed in the same situation with respect to damages, as if the 
contract had been performed.52 
This proposition was followed by the Privy Council in Wertheim v. 
Chicoutimi Pulp Co.,53 and was expressly adopted by the Supreme 
51 Bank of America, supra note 1 at para. 43.
52 (1848), 154 E.R. 363 at 365.
53 [1911] A.C. 301.
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Court of Canada in Haack v. Martin.54 In an ordinary claim for breach 
of contract, the plaintiff is entitled to receive the value, not the cost, of 
the expected performance of the contract at the date of the breach.
While the usual measure of damages for breach of contract will be 
the expectation measure, this is not invariably so. The plaintiff may also 
receive reliance damages or specific performance. Reliance damages 
are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for actual costs incurred in con-
templation of, or in preparation for, the performance of the contract. 
They are awarded where expectation damages are inappropriate (when, 
for example, they are too speculative). Further, reliance damages are an 
alternative measure of damage; the plaintiff is not entitled to both ex-
pectation and reliance damages.55 Specific performance may be awarded 
in certain circumstances, especially in contracts dealing with land. 
In Bank of America, the trial judge awarded the shortfall between 
the sale price obtained by the receiver and the amount outstanding under 
the Loan Agreement and the TOC Assignment. This award was never in 
dispute. Major J. could have exercised the Courtʼ’s equitable jurisdic-
tion and awarded compound interest as an extension of the trial judge 
awarding specific performance in enforcing the debt. But, as is evident 
from the above analysis, the specific enforcement of a debt alone is not 
traditionally sufficient to invoke the Courtʼ’s power to award compound 
interest in equity. The Supreme Court in Bank of America did not think 
it appropriate to extend the scope of awarding compound interest in eq-
uity to include the specific performance of a debt. Further, it was stated 
earlier that Major J. did not think it desirable to limit compound interest 
to the Courtʼ’s equitable jurisdiction, as such a scheme ignores the need 
to extend fully the compensatory character of compound interest to all 
judgment awards.
Rather than extend the circumstances under which a court could 
award compound interest in equity, Major J. indicated that he was mak-
ing an incremental change to the common law so as to allow the award-
ing of compound interest. As is discussed below, it appears that the 
change was not incremental but substantial. In making the allegedly in-
cremental change, Major J. relied upon restitution principles, despite the 
fact that restitution is not traditionally a remedy for breach of contract. 
54 [1927] S.C.R. 413 at 416.
55 Sunshine Vacation Villas Ltd. v. Hudsonʼ’s Bay Co. (1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 93 at 99 (B.C. C.A.).
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2. Restitution in Actions For Unjust Enrichment
Until recently, courts have generally refused to award restitution for a 
mere breach of contract. The traditional view was that where there was a 
repudiatory breach,56 the non-breaching party had two courses of action. 
He or she could decide to treat the contract as ongoing and seek expecta-
tion damages or specific performance; alternatively, the innocent party 
could consider the contract as at an end and choose to pursue a claim of 
restitution for any benefits it had conferred on the guilty party. The term 
“restitution” as used here denotes situations in which one party seeks 
to retrieve benefits that it has conferred on another party – it is a claim 
for unjust enrichment. This is distinct from “disgorgement of profits.” 
In cases of disgorgement, one party seeks to obtain profits made by the 
other party, which can be unrelated to any benefit conferred by the other 
party. Disgorgement of profits can be awarded regardless of whether 
the defendant has been enriched. Both claims for unjust enrichment and 
claims for disgorgement of profits are said to be restitutionary remedies. 
It is important to note, however, that the two remedies are distinct in 
nature, and are available in different circumstances. 
In contractual relations, it is not open to the innocent party both to 
affirm the contract and to seek restitution.57 In pursuing restitution, the 
parties are treated as if there never was any contract between them. This 
is not, however, entirely realistic. It has been suggested that the contract 
cannot be entirely ignored, as the plaintiffʼ’s restitution claim can only 
be established if it is unjust for the defendant to retain a benefit con-
ferred, and it is only unjust if the benefit expected to be received by the 
plaintiff under the contract has substantially failed.58
A plaintiff claiming restitution traditionally had to establish that a 
benefit was conferred upon the defendant, and that the defendant had 
completely failed to give any consideration in return. If, however, a con-
tract was fully performed by the plaintiff, and the defendant refused to 
56 A repudiatory breach occurs where the innocent party is deprived of substantially all of the 
benefit, which it was intended to receive from the contract. See Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. v. 
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd, [1962] 2 Q.B. 26 (Eng.C.A.) at 66. 
57 Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Co., [1954] S.C.R. 725.
58 The Law of Damages, supra note 45 at 474.
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pay the contract price, restitution was not available.59 The requirement 
for a total failure of consideration was set out in Hunt v. Silk.60 In that 
case, a landlord agreed to grant early possession to his tenant in ex-
change for a deposit. The landlord further agreed to execute a lease for a 
period of nineteen years, and promised to perform certain repairs within 
ten days of the tenant taking possession. After the ten days had elapsed, 
with no action taken by the landlord, the tenant attempted to rescind 
the agreement and sought the return of his deposit. Lord Ellenborough 
C.J. held that in order for restitution to be available, the parties must be 
capable of being restored to the status quo.61 Since the agreement had 
been partially executed and the plaintiff had received some of the ben-
efit of the bargain through his use of the premises, restitution was not 
available. 
The need for a total lack of consideration on the part of the de-
fendant has since been relaxed, so as to permit the plaintiff to receive 
some benefit under the bargain. As Maddaugh and McCamus point out, 
Giles v. Edwards62 is now the preferred authority among contemporary 
scholars.63 In Giles, the defendant was to cut, cord and deliver all of his 
cordwood at given location. A fixed sum was to be paid for every cord of 
wood. The defendant cut and corded some wood, and the plaintiff paid 
him twenty guineas. When the defendant failed to cord the rest of the 
wood, the Court awarded the plaintiff the return of its twenty guineas.64 
Hence, even though the plaintiff had received some benefit, it was still 
possible to recover the funds it had advanced to the defendant.65 Madd-
59 Morrison-Knudsen v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (No.2) (1978), 85 D.L.R. 
(3d) 186 (B.C.C.A.). Where the plaintiff fully performed his or her end of the bargain, a claim 
for damages for breach of contract will be limited to the agreed contract price, as this will give 
the plaintiff exactly which he or she expected to receive. Anything more would allow the plain-
tiff to recover for making a bad bargain.
60 (1804), 5 East 449 (K.B.). 
61 Ibid. at 452.
62 (1797), 101 E.R. 920 [Giles].
63 Peter D. Maddaugh & John D. McCamus, The Law of Restitution, (Toronto: Canada Law 
Book, 1990) at 423.
64 Giles, supra note 62 at 920-921.
65 That a plaintiff can receive restitution, even though he or she has received some consideration 
from the defendant is further supported in Rowland v. Divall, [1923] 2 K.B. 500 at 506 (C.A.) 
[Rowland]. In Rowland, the defendant sold a stolen car to the plaintiff. Despite having had the 
interim use of the car and having derived some benefit therefrom, the plaintiff was held entitled 
to a return of the full purchase price.
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augh and McCamus note that Hunt can be reconciled with the approach 
in Giles, if it is interpreted as positing that the plaintiffʼ’s occupation 
after knowledge of the breach amounted to a waiver of his right to ter-
minate the agreement.66 
Courts have shown some willingness to offset the partial benefit de-
rived from a plaintiff against awards of restitution. In Gibbons v. Trapp 
Motors,67 the plaintiff was sold a defective car by the defendant. Nu-
merous attempts were made by the defendant to repair the defects to 
no avail. The plaintiff was awarded the full purchase price paid for the 
car, but a reasonable allowance was deducted for the value of the use 
of the car and for the failed repair attempts.68 The foregoing cases dem-
onstrate that the law has been modified somewhat to allow a plaintiff to 
receive restitution, despite having received some consideration from the 
defendant, and such partial consideration received from the defendant 
may be offset against the plaintiffʼ’s claim for restitution.
As mentioned above, restitution, in the sense being discussed here, 
is based upon principles of unjust enrichment. The leading Canadian au-
thority on unjust enrichment is Peter v. Beblow.69 In that case, there was 
no contract; rather the Court was dealing with a property dispute of a co-
habiting couple. The plaintiff was seeking recompense for twelve years 
of household labour. The Court held that to establish unjust enrichment, 
the defendant must have been enriched, the plaintiff must have been cor-
respondingly deprived of a benefit, and there must have been no juristic 
reason for the enrichment.70 Once an unjust enrichment has been estab-
lished, the court will then award either a constructive trust or damages. 
In order for a constructive trust to be awarded, monetary compensation 
must be inadequate, there must be a link between the benefit conferred 
and the property over which the trust is claimed, and the contribution 
must be sufficiently substantial and direct so as to entitle the claimant to 
a portion of the proceeds of disposition.	
    71 Despite having been decided 
in the family law context, the principles in Peter v. Beblow could argu-
66 The Law of Restitution, supra note 63 at 423-424.
67 (1970), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 742 (B.C. S.C.).
68 Ibid. at 745.
69 1993 CarswellBC 44 (S.C.C.).
70 Ibid. at para. 3.
71 Ibid.
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ably be applied in cases where a party to a contract decides to sue in res-
titution where the stated criteria are met. The twelve-year cohabitation 
of the parties in Peter v. Beblow was akin to a marital relationship, and 
some argue that marriages are in essence contracts.72 Hence, it is at least 
plausible to apply the Peter v. Beblow principles to contracts generally. 
In Bank of America, the plaintiff bank can be said to have conferred 
a benefit upon the defendant trust company. The plaintiff, however, 
clearly chose to affirm the ATOC and pursue its action in breach of con-
tract, rather than to disaffirm the contract and claim in restitution. At 
first glance, then, it appears that Major J. was ignoring precedent in ap-
plying restitution principles in Bank of America. However, a more prob-
ing analysis reveals that Major J. was relying upon the disgorgement of 
profits branch of restitution in his judgment. On this view, his decision 
is arguably consistent with precedent applying disgorgement principles 
in cases of breach of contract. 
3. Disgorgement of Profits
In cases of disgorgement the defendant is ordered to account for prof-
its wrongfully made and to pay them to the plaintiff whether or not 
the plaintiff suffered any corresponding loss. Disgorgement of profits 
has been awarded in cases of waiver of tort, where the interest of the 
plaintiff is proprietary in nature, and where there have been breaches of 
fiduciary duty.
In cases of waiver of tort, the plaintiff is said to have retrospectively 
authorized the wrongful conduct of the defendant, and the defendant 
is liable to account as an agent on the plaintiffʼ’s behalf. The remedy 
is highly artificial,73 as the wrong is never actually condoned, but it is 
one way for the plaintiff to retrieve profits wrongfully made by the de-
fendant where the plaintiff has not suffered any damage that would be 
recoverable in tort. The artificial nature of the doctrine of waiver of 
tort has created injustices, especially in cases of trespass where it was 
commonly, but erroneously, held that waiver of tort was not available.	
    74 
72 Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
73 See Lord Atkinʼ’s comments in United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd., [1941] A.C. 1 at 
para. 28 (H.L.). 
74 See Phillips v. Homfray (1883), 24 Ch. D. 439 (C.A.) [Phillips]. 
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Wayleave cases, where trespassing defendants are ordered to pay plain-
tiffs a reasonable hire for the unauthorized use of land and the value 
derived from the tort, have partially corrected this injustice.75 
A similar remedy of disgorgement has been awarded to plaintiffs 
whose proprietary interests were at issue in cases of breach of contract. 
As noted above, the ordinary measure of damages for breach of contract 
is the expectation measure. Whether the plaintiff held a proprietary in-
terest was only relevant to the issue of whether to award specific per-
formance; it did not entitle the plaintiff to disgorge the gains made by 
the defendant through his or her breach. A plaintiff was not entitled to 
an account of profits or disgorgement for a mere breach of contract, but 
was only entitled to the value of his or her loss. This principle was ap-
plied even in cases dealing with proprietary interests.	
   76
Maddaugh and McCamus offer two explanations for the exception 
of allowing a disgorgement of profits for a breach of contract where the 
plaintiffʼ’s proprietary interests are at stake. First, the party in default 
could also be concurrently in breach of another existing restitution obli-
gation, such as breach of fiduciary duty. Second, there are 
instances in which contractual damages in the traditional measure 
are inadequate in a matter which has traditionally attracted equitable 
relief, but where such relief is not, by reason of the circumstances of 
the particular case, available to the plaintiff.77  
The last category of cases allowing disgorgement of profits for breach 
of contract involves breaches of fiduciary duties. These cases often in-
75 See Whitham v. Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Company, [1896] 2 Ch. 538 (C.A.). 
76 Tito v. Waddell, [1977] Ch. 106 at 332 [Tito]. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining, 382 
P.2d 109 at 114 (Okla. S.C. 1963). See also Occidental Worldwide Investment Corp. v. Skibs A/S 
Avanti, The Siboen and The Sibotre, [1976] 1 Lloydʼ’s Rep. 293 (Q.B.), where a claim for an 
account of profits was rejected when ship owners terminated their ship-leases with the lessees, 
when market prices began to rise.
77 The Law of Restitution, supra note 63 at 436. In this second instance, Maddaugh and McCa-
mus appear to be referring to instances where a Court uses its discretion to award damages in 
lieu of specific performance or in lieu of an injunction pursuant to s.99 of the Courts of Justice 
Act. For examples see the following cases: Lake v. Bayliss, [1974] 2 All E.R. 1114 (Ch.D.); 
Wrotham Park Estate Co. v. Parkside Homes, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798 (Ch.D.); Surrey County 
Council v. Bredero Homes, [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1361 (C.A.). But see Jaggard v. Sawyer, [1995] 2 
All E.R. 189 (C.A.).
78 Reading v. A.-G., [1951] A.C. 507 (H.L.) [Reading].
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volved public servants that had either abused positions of trust78 or mis-
used state secrets in the course of their employment in order to profit.79 
In such cases, the wrongdoers are often ordered to account for their 
profits made as a result of the breach, and to repay the same to their 
employers.80
The last word on this subject comes from Attorney General v. Blake,	
    
81 although the case did not involve a breach of fiduciary duty. The 
House of Lords in Blake came to a similar result as Reading and Snepp, 
but it took a startlingly different approach in arriving at its decision. 
George Blake acted as an agent for the Soviet Union while employed 
by the British Government. He was found guilty of offences under the 
Official Secrets Act and was sentenced to forty-two years in prison. He 
escaped and fled to Moscow, where he subsequently wrote his autobi-
ography. While the information released in the autobiography was no 
longer confidential at the time of publication, its release nonetheless 
breached Blakeʼ’s employment contract. 
At trial, the Crownʼ’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty was rejected, 
and was subsequently dismissed on appeal. The Crown decided not to 
appeal this aspect of its claim before the House of Lords. Notwithstand-
ing that decision, Lord Nicholls stated that he found it unsatisfactory 
that an account of profits would have been available had the release of 
information constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, but not where the 
same release of information merely amounted to a breach of contract. 
He stated that: 
if confidential information is wrongfully divulged in breach of a 
non-disclosure agreement, it would be nothing short of sophistry 
to say that an account of profits may be ordered in respect of the 
equitable wrong but not in respect of the breach of contract which 
governs the relationship between the parties.82 
He continued:
79 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (U.S.S.C. 1980) [Snepp]. Attorney-General v. Guard-
ian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), [1988] H.L.J. No. 42 (QL) [Guardian].
80 Reading, supra note 78 at 517. Snepp, ibid. at 516. Guardian, ibid. at para. 81.
81 [2000] H.L.J. No. 47 (QL) [Blake].
82 Ibid. at para. 32.
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in contract, as well as tort, damages are not always narrowly 
confined to recoupment of financial loss. In a suitable case damages 
for breach of contract may be measured by the benefit gained by the 
wrongdoer from the breach. The defendant must make a reasonable 
payment in respect of the benefit he has gained.83
Lord Nicholls decided that damages, specific performance and injunc-
tions, with the characterization of some contractual obligations as fi-
duciary, would ordinarily provide an adequate response to a breach of 
contract.84 It is only in exceptional cases, “where those remedies are 
inadequate, that any question of accounting for profits will arise. No 
fixed rules can be prescribed.”85 Even though no fixed rule can be set 
out, Lord Nicholls states “a useful general guide…is whether the plain-
tiff had a legitimate interest in preventing the defendantʼ’s profit-mak-
ing activity and, hence, in depriving him of his profit.”86 Lord Nicholls 
thought that the present situation was one in which the plaintiff had a 
legitimate interest. The Crown had a legitimate interest in deterring this 
type of conduct in the future, and a disgorgement of profits would send 
a strong message that conduct similar to Blakeʼ’s would not permit a 
wrongdoerʼ’s gain.87 He noted that Blakeʼ’s undertaking, if not a fiduciary 
obligation, was closely akin to such an obligation where an account of 
profits is a standard remedy in the event of breach.88 Hence, Lord Ni-
chollsʼ’ decision seems to be more concerned with the substance rather 
than the form of the contractual relationship. He was not deterred from 
awarding an account of profits simply because there was no fiduciary 
relationship. 
Blake is a ground-breaking decision in England. It awarded a res-
titutionary account of profits or disgorgement for a breach of contract 
where there was no concurrent breach of fiduciary duty, nor any proprie-
tary interests at stake. The decision seems to stray from the reasoning in 
the earlier cases of Surrey County Council v. Bredero Homes89 and Jag-
83 Ibid. at para. 28.
84 Ibid. at para. 33.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid. at para. 39.
88 Ibid. at para. 40.
89 Supra note 77.
90 Supra note 77.
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gard v. Sawyer,90 which were concerned with the distinction between 
awarding damages under the Lord Cairnsʼ’ Act91 against damages for 
breach of contract alone. Lord Nicholls did not want to strain existing 
concepts in order to reach his desired result, which was something he 
perceived earlier decisions as doing.92 He created a new general prin-
ciple, rather than a rule, which allows disgorgement in cases of simple 
breach of contract in exceptional cases. The plaintiff must have a “le-
gitimate interest in preventing the defendantʼ’s profit making activity.” 
How this latter requirement will be interpreted remains to be seen. It is 
clear, however, that in the English courts disgorgement will no longer 
be limited to cases involving fiduciary breaches or special proprietary 
interests of the plaintiff.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada did not consider Blake 
in Bank of America, even though the Court decided to apply restitution 
principles in a case of breach of contract. Just as the House of Lords 
sought to avoid the constraints of fitting into the categories of equitable 
remedies when applying restitution in contract, the Supreme Court of 
Canada did not want to be constrained by the traditional categories al-
lowing compound interest on judgment awards in equity. In both cases, 
traditional equitable principles restricted the availability of a remedy 
at common law. It did not appear open to the Court to use restitution 
principles in the sense of unjust enrichment from a benefit conferred, 
as the dispute in issue was brought in an action for breach of contract, 
not for rescission and restitution. Instead, Major J. presumably relied 
on the proprietary nature of the debt owed by Mutual Trust to Bank of 
America in order to introduce disgorgement principles. While he does 
not explicitly use the term “disgorgement,” both the context of Bank of 
America and the absence of any discussion of Blake suggest that this 
was his intended meaning. Such an application of disgorgement princi-
ples would be consistent with earlier case law involving proprietary in-
terests in contract cases. The use of disgorgement principles in Bank of 
America was presumably based on an attempt to make the “incremental 
change” to the common law of allowing compound interest on judgment 
awards appear less drastic. 
In deciding to use restitution along with compensatory principles to 
award compound interest on judgment awards, the Supreme Court of 
91 1858 (U.K.), 21 & 22 Vict., c.27.
92 Supra note 81 at para. 30.
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Canada implicitly seemed to realize that it was making another substan-
tial change by making restitution available for a mere breach of con-
tract. Major J. realized that he needed to minimize the availability of 
restitution in cases of breach of contract. Instead of relying on the prin-
ciples set out in Blake, the Court chose to limit its application to cases 
involving inefficient breaches.
The Supreme Court of Canada should have restrained itself to us-
ing compensatory principles in deciding to award compound judgment 
interest at common law. Trying to limit the availability of compound 
interest by limiting restitution to cases of inefficient breach or by using 
the Blake principles were both inappropriate options. As will be dis-
cussed below, it is unclear whether the use of disgorgement in cases of 
breach of contract will be constrained to cases of inefficient breach. By 
allowing disgorgement in cases of breach of contract where there is an 
inefficient breach, the Court may have inadvertently transformed con-
tract rights to property rights, as the cost of performance, rather than its 
value, becomes available to plaintiffs in the event of such a breach.
IV. EFFICIENT BREACH AS A LIMIT TO RESTITUTION IN 
CONTRACT
Instead of relying upon the general principle in Blake as a method to 
limit restitution in contract to exceptional cases, the Supreme Court of 
Canada chose to limit the use of restitution in contract with the doctrine 
of efficient breach. Major J. held in Bank of America that restitution 
should only be available in cases where there is no efficient breach, as 
“efficient breach should not be discouraged by the Courts.”93 The Court 
describes efficient breach as a Pareto optimal situation where one party 
is better off, and no party is worse off.94 In such a situation, Major J. 
ruled that a court should “usually award money damages for breach 
of contract equal to the value of the bargain to the plaintiff.”95 In brief, 
expectation damages for breach of contract support the theory of allow-
93 Bank of America, supra note 1 at para. 31.
94 Bank of America, supra note 1 at para. 31
95 Bank of America, supra note 1 at para. 31
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ing efficient breaches. This was recognized by R.A. Posner in Economic 
Analysis of Law.96 
Posner writes that expectation damages are value maximizing: if 
the profits gained from a breach of contract would exceed the profits 
expected to be made by the other party from the completion of the con-
tract, and if damages are limited to the expectation measure, then there 
is an incentive for the breach to occur (assuming that the breaching par-
ty would stand to make less of a profit had the contract been performed 
to completion). The party in default would likely be sued for breach of 
contract, and would be liable to pay the plaintiff the expected value or 
profit to be made from the full completion of the contract. The result 
is that the plaintiff would receive the expected value of the bargain, 
and the defendant would be able to profit from escaping its obligations 
under the contract. Posner reasons that since neither party is worse off, 
and one is better off, then the breach coupled with expectation damages 
is value maximizing.97 Had the defendant been forced to complete the 
performance of the contract, the plaintiff would be in the same situation, 
but the defendant would be in a worse situation. Thus, expectation dam-
ages are more efficient.
Several commentators have criticized the theory of efficient breach.98 
They argue that efficient breach ignores transaction costs, relational 
costs and externalities.99 It has been argued further that it is impossible 
to determine whether a breach will be more efficient under an expecta-
tion rule as opposed to a rule supporting specific performance, because 
transaction costs are unique in every situation.100
The critics argue in favour of a rule that prefers specific perform-
ance101 over expectation damages, because the bargaining fostered by 
96 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). 
97 Ibid. 
98 I.R. Macneil, “Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky” (1982) 68 Va. L. Rev. 947 at 
950 [Macneil]. Lionel D. Smith, “Disgorgement of the Profits of Breach of Contract: Property, 
Contract and ʻ‘Efficient Breachʼ’” (1994) 24 Can. Bus. L.J. 121 [Smith]. Daniel Friedmann, “The 
Efficient Breach Fallacy” (1989) 18 Journal of Legal Studies 1 [Friedmann]. Joseph M. Perillo, 
“Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference” (2000) 68 
Fordham L. Rev. 1085 [Perillo].
99 Macneil, ibid. at 957-958. Relational costs include loss of reputation from the breach and loss 
of future opportunies to deal.
100 Ibid. at 952.
101 Ibid. at 960.
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such a rule “seems ideally designed to prevent omission from the de-
cisional calculus of the costs of either party.”102 They argue further that 
condoning efficient breaches may lead to an unwillingness to rely upon 
suppliers.103 They contend that the law wants to discourage breaches, 
efficient or otherwise.104 This is evidenced by the tort of interference 
with contract,105 which shows that the law does not want to encourage 
wilful efficient breaches of contract.106 The common thread among crit-
ics of efficient breach is their preference of specific performance107 and 
disgorgement of profits108 instead of expectation damages for breach 
of contract. These preferences lead the critics to the view that contract 
rights should have the same status as property rights.109
The critics of efficient breach go too far in asserting this position. 
The objective of expectation damages is to compensate the plaintiff, 
not to punish the defendant by disgorging his or her profits.110 To allow 
a remedy of specific performance or disgorgement of profits for every 
contract could amount to extortion against the party who breaches. One 
would have to negotiate in every case where one wishes to be relieved 
from the obligations of a contract. A reasonable non-breaching party 
will only accept a settlement amount close to, or at, the value of the cost 
of the expected performance. 
It is incorrect to state that there is no difference between property 
rights and contractual ones as suggested by the authors above. Contrac-
tual rights exist in personam,111 whereas property rights exist in rem. 
Property rights face exposure to damage or conversion by anyone and 
everyone, whereas the integrity of contract rights face a lower risk and 
102 Ibid.
103 Friedmann, supra note 98 at 7. 
104 Perillo, supra note 98 at 1092.
105 Friedmann, supra note 98 at 20. Perillo, supra note 98 at 1100. The tort of interference with 
contract is inconsistent with the theory of efficient breach, as it is incongruent to allow one party 
to breach with relative impunity (other than paying expectation damages), while another party 
who procured the breach may be liable for the tort of interfering with the contract.
106 Perillo, ibid. 
107 Macneil, supra note 98 at 960. Perillo, supra note 98 at 1105-1106.
108 Smith, supra note 98 at 123.
109 Macneil, supra note 98 at 960. Smith, supra note 98 at 115. Perillo, supra note 98 at 1105-
1106. 
110 Tito, supra  note 76.
111 Except in the tort of interfering with a contract.
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generally this risk is confined to the acts or omissions of another party to 
the contract. One is in a better situation to assess the risks of a contract 
upon formation as one can learn about the other partyʼ’s credit history, 
for example. No degree of preparation can protect against all the risks 
posed by acquiring property as against the world at large. Since property 
rights face more risk, it is justifiable to allow a stronger remedy when 
they are breached. Since the risk can be calculable in cases of contract, 
it is reasonable to have a weaker remedy in most instances. 
Additionally, if expectation damages were not the ordinary rule and 
specific performance or disgorgement of profits were available for all 
breaches, then one would naturally be more reluctant to enter contracts. 
More time and money would be invested into ensuring that one is enter-
ing a profitable bargain. This in itself is inefficient. On the other hand, 
if one restricts ordinary breaches of contract to expectation damages 
generally, then there is commercial certainty and no one will ever be 
any worse off. Parties will be more willing to enter contracts if they 
know that they will ordinarily be limited to paying for the value of the 
performance on the event of a breach, as opposed to its cost. 
The belief that contract rights should attract the same legal protec-
tion as property rights leads to opposition to any theory which supports 
finding a distinction between such rights. Efficient breach clearly em-
braces such a distinction, as it relies upon the availability of expecta-
tion damages for breach of contract. As noted above, there is a clear 
distinction between contract rights and property rights, and the same 
protection should not be offered to both. Expectation damages are nec-
essary to promote the willingness to enter contracts and they are fair in 
that they fully compensate the plaintiff without punishing the defend-
ant. Further, expectation damages have the incidental effect of deterring 
some breaches; contractual parties will want to avoid tarnishing their 
goodwill, for example. 
Efficient breach recognizes the difference between contractual 
rights and property rights and the Supreme Court of Canada was cor-
rect in recognizing this difference. In doing so, Major J. chose to limit 
the availability of restitution in contract to cases involving non-efficient 
breaches. He chose to adopt restitution principles to expand the avail-
ability of compound interest, but he realized that this would have the 
unfortunate result of elevating contractual rights to the status of prop-
erty rights. Hence, it was necessary for him to backtrack and endorse 
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efficient breach effectively to negate the impact of allowing restitution 
in contract. However, this distinction was already inherent in the com-
mon law which generally supports expectation damages for breach of 
contract. The need specifically to endorse efficient breach could have 
been avoided had the Supreme Court restricted its analysis to compen-
satory principles.
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF BANK OF AMERICA
While it was necessary to place a check on the availability of restitution 
in contract, the application of restitution principles in Bank of America 
was unnecessary in the first place. Mitchell McInnes points out that the 
award of compound interest could have stood on compensatory princi-
ples alone in Bank of America.112 
Considering the plaintiff was owed a sum of money by the defend-
ant, the award needed to reflect the time value of money to comprise ad-
equate compensation. This could only be achieved through compound 
interest. Instead of simply extending the common law to allow compound 
interest on compensatory principles, the Court chose to apply restitution 
principles. To limit the availability of restitution, the Supreme Court 
indicated that restitution should not be available where a breach is ef-
ficient. Major J. held that since the breach in the case at hand was a zero 
sum optimal (inefficient), as opposed to a Pareto optimal, then restitu-
tion could be awarded as there was no efficient breach. McInnes points 
out that if restitution is limited to cases involving inefficient breach, then 
its use is redundant.113 Where there is no efficient breach, a plaintiffʼ’s 
loss is capable of supporting the same relief on compensatory principles 
alone.114 It is only where a defendantʼ’s gain exceeds the plaintiffʼ’s loss 
(an efficient breach) that disgorgement makes any difference, as com-
pensation alone would allow the defendant to retain his profit. McInnes 
therefore concludes “the restitution principle appears limited to cases in 
112 Mitchell McInnes, “Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: Bank of America Cana-
da v. Mutual Trust Co.” (2002) Can. Bus. L.J. 125 [McInnes].
113 Ibid. at 132. 
114 Ibid. 
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which it is unnecessary. It can only catch those wrongful gains that are 
mirrored by compensable losses.”115
While McInnes is correct in stating that the Court has effectively 
limited the applicability of restitution to cases where it is redundant, 
this appears to have been Major J.ʼ’s intent. He wanted to implement 
restitution principles merely as a vehicle to change the common law 
incrementally to allow compound interest. He did not want to make res-
titution available in contract generally – thus, he chose to limit its effect 
by confining its employment to cases of non-efficient breach. As noted 
above, the redundancy of restitution in these circumstances supports the 
position that Major J. introduced restitution principles for the sole rea-
son of facilitating his incremental change to the common law. 
McInnes feels that it is unfortunate that Major J. restricts the applica-
tion of disgorgement principles to cases involving inefficient breaches, 
and he would have preferred that disgorgement be available to breaches 
of contract generally where the defendant is guilty of some wrongdo-
ing.116 But McInnesʼ’ desire supports the view that contract rights should 
have the same status as property rights. Further, McInnesʼ’ position ig-
nores the purpose of expectation damages in contract, which is compen-
sation, rather than punishment.117 To punish a wrongdoer for breaching a 
contract and thereby making a profit is a remedy best suited to the public 
law or criminal law setting, not to private law claims; it is a societal, not 
a private, objective. 
Unfortunately, there is evidence in Bank of America which might 
be relied upon in future cases to extend restitution in contract beyond 
cases of inefficient breach. If one considers closely the facts in Bank of 
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid. at 132.
117 McInnes notes City of New Orleans v. Firemenʼ’s Charitable Assoc. (1891), 9 So. 486 (S.C. 
La.) as an example. McInnes thinks that disgorgement would have been appropriate to punish 
the fire protection company that did not acquire firefighting equipment needed to protect its 
client, even though during the term of the contract no damages were suffered by the client. 
The author submits that had a fire occurred, the client would have suffered damages and would 
have been entitled to the value of the contract, namely the value of the fire protection. Since no 
damages occurred, there was no need to compensate the client. In effect, the fire protection com-
pany took a risk and decided to act as an insurer. While such conduct may have amounted to a 
wrongdoing, is was not a civil wrongdoing; rather, it is was a criminal wrongdoing. If anything, 
the acts of the fire protection company may have amounted to a fraud. Disgorgement principles 
should not be used as a means to deal with criminal conduct.
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America, it becomes apparent that the Supreme Court in effect awarded 
restitution in a case of efficient breach. Mutual Trust may have relied 
on the state of the law as it stood prior to Bank of America in making 
its decision to breach the TOC and the ATOC. Mutual Trust may have 
reasoned that if it breached the TOC or the ATOC, then under the exist-
ing state of the law only simple interest would have been available on 
a judgment award given to Bank of America. At the same time, Mutual 
Trust could have planned on investing the money that it owed to Bank 
of America at compound rates. Mutual Trust would profit by breach-
ing, as it would pay simple interest on any judgement award to Bank of 
America, while earning compound interest itself.118 The Supreme Court 
actually presumed that Mutual Trust engaged in this exact scheme.119 
Since Justice Majorʼ’s decision effectively does exactly what it holds is 
impermissible (i.e. awards restitution in a case of efficient breach), then 
his decision might be interpreted by subsequent cases as merely setting 
forth a general discretionary principle. This is further supported by Ma-
jor J.ʼ’s statement that “efficient breach should not be discouraged by the 
Courts.”120 He did not state that it must not be discouraged.
Apart from the ambiguity as to whether restitution could ever be 
awarded in cases of efficient breach, the Court is also unclear as to what 
meaning it ascribes to the term “restitution.” Looking at the language 
used, it could be argued that the Court was referring to restitution in the 
unjust enrichment sense. However, considering its actions, it appears 
that a disgorgement of profits was taking place. In support of finding 
that the Court was referring to unjust enrichment, it is noteworthy that it 
did not address the need for Bank of America to mitigate its loss. Since 
mitigation is not a requirement in a claim for unjust enrichment,121 this 
would seem to suggest that the Court was not referring to disgorgement. 
Further, the Court cites Waddamsʼ’ The Law of Damages122 when it ex-
plains the availability of restitution in contract.123 The passage referred 
118 Major J. seemed to have recognized this problem. Bank of America. supra note 1 at para. 
46.
119 Bank of America. supra note 1 at para. 59.
120 Bank of America. supra note 1 at para. 31.
121 G.H. Fridman & J.G. McLeod, Restitution 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 211.
122 Supra note 45.
123 Bank of America. supra note 1 at para. 30.
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to examines cases where an action was brought to recover benefits con-
ferred by the plaintiff, not to cases of disgorgement.
As has been stressed throughout this article, however, there is am-
ple evidence indicating that the Court was referring to disgorgement 
when it used the term “restitution.” It is important to recall that Bank of 
America had a proprietary interest at stake in the case, and violations 
of proprietary interests have given rise to disgorgement of profits in the 
past. Perhaps most importantly, Bank of Americaʼ’s claim was for dam-
ages for breach of contract. This was determinative for McInnes, and led 
him to conclude that the Court was referring to disgorgement.124 Finally, 
since the award of compound interest essentially deprived Mutual Trust 
of any compound interest it may have gained from a third party, and 
the compound interest was not a benefit conferred by Bank of America, 
it is suggested that the Court was referring to disgorgement of profits. 
Although the balance is tipped in concluding the Supreme Court was 
referring to disgorgement, the equivocal nature of its decision leaves 
open the possibility for future decisions to interpret Bank of America as 
referring to unjust enrichment.
In addition to the ambiguity over which sense of the term “restitu-
tion” was used by the Court, it is unclear how restricted the application 
of compound interest is meant to be in future cases. At first glance, it 
may appear that the Court is restricting the application of compound 
interest to situations which are factually similar to those in Bank of 
America; that is, where the parties are both commercial lenders and are 
familiar with the operation of compound interest schemes. This was a 
significant factor in Major J.ʼ’s analysis. Major J. relied on the foresee-
ability principle set out in Hadley v. Baxendale125 for limiting the ap-
plication of compound interest to cases where the parties contemplated 
at the outset of their relationship that compound interest would govern 
their transactions.126 In this regard, Major J. stated:
With respect to the failure to repay the loan in this appeal when 
due, it cannot be said that the cost of such delay was not in the 
contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, 
particularly as both parties were in the business of lending. … Absent 
124 McInnes, supra note 112 at 130.
125 (1854), 9 Exch. 341 (Ex. Ct.).
126 Bank of America, supra note 1 at para. 47.
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exceptional circumstances, the interest rate which had governed the 
loan prior to breach would be the appropriate rate to govern the 
post-breach loan.127
Despite the apparent limiting effect of the passage above, Major J. later 
stated:
an award of compound pre- and post-judgment interest will generally 
be limited to breach of contract cases where there is evidence that 
the parties agreed, knew, or should have known, that the money 
which is the subject of the dispute would bear compound interest 
as damages. It may by awarded as consequential damages in other 
cases but there would be the usual requirement of proving that 
damage component.128 [Emphasis added].
It is therefore clear that the Court is not necessarily restricting the award-
ing of compound interest to cases where the test in Hadley is met. Com-
pound interest may be available where a plaintiff suffers consequential 
losses in mitigating his or her damages. At the very least, it appears that 
that compound interest could be awarded as consequential damages. 
Bank of America has subsequently been followed in provinces other 
than Ontario. British Columbia lacks provisions similar to Ontarioʼ’s 
s.128 and s.129 of the Courts of Justice Act. Notwithstanding that fact, 
its Supreme Court initially embraced Bank of America.129 Only a month 
later, however, the British Columbia Supreme Court held Bank of Amer-
ica did not apply in British Columbia, as “there are no sections in the 
British Columbia statute which are comparable to ss. 128 and 129 of the 
Ontario statute.”130 Although Pacific Playground Holdings was a case 
dealing with sophisticated commercial parties, it does suggest a willing-
ness to apply the Bank of America decision broadly. Still, there is obvi-
ously disagreement in British Columbia as to whether Bank of America 
applies to its legislation. 
Fortunately, the cases to date referring to Bank of America have fo-
cussed on the compensatory portion of the Supreme Courtʼ’s analysis. 
127 Bank of America. supra note 1 at para. 49.
128 Bank of America. supra note 1 at para. 55. 
129 Pacific Playground Holdings v. Endeavour Developments 2002 CarswellBC 2727 at para. 35 
(B.C. S.C.) [Pacific Playground Holdings].
130 Hallam v. Shen, [2002] B.C.J. No. 2871 at paras. 24, 25 (S.C.) (QL).
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The Alberta Court of Appeal in Alberta (Minister of Infrastructure) v. 
Nilsson131 viewed Bank of America
as abrogating the narrow interpretation compound interest is 
available under the common law. …Bank of America mandates a 
common law availability where compound interest is necessary to 
compensate accurately for the proven damages.132 
As McInnes suggested, Bank of America could have been decided on 
compensatory principles alone. This would have resulted in a fairer ap-
plication of awarding compound interest.
The purpose of awarding judgment interest is to compensate plain-
tiffs rather than to punish defendants: the plaintiff is to receive the time 
value of money that is rightly due to him or her under a judgment award. 
The Supreme Court acceded to this point in the course of its judgment.133 
In not applying mitigation principles, however, the Supreme Court may 
have overcompensated the plaintiff and punished the defendant. In Bank 
of America, the cause of action was breach of contract. Therefore, miti-
gation principles should have applied. Suppose Bank of America had 
mitigated its loss by borrowing money from another party. It could then 
have lent that money to a third party for the same rate of compound 
interest set out in the ATOC and the TOC. It would have saved itself 
from losing any compound interest on the principal amount, except for 
the intervening time that it took to secure a loan, and except for the 
interest that it would have owed to the creditor. Mutual Trust should 
then only have been held liable to repay the interest paid to the credi-
tor, and for the interest lost during the intervening period. Perhaps this 
overly complicated scenario was something which the Supreme Court 
wished to avoid, and it introduced restitution principles in the hopes that 
mitigation principles would no longer apply. But, as was stated above, 
it is unclear to which sense of the term “restitution” the Supreme Court 
referred.
131 [2002] A.J. No. 1474 (QL).
132 Ibid. at para. 185.
133 Bank of America, supra note 1 at para. 36.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The effects of the Bank of America decision are as far reaching as they 
are equivocal. Due to the uncertain effects that this judgment will have, 
the majority of the House of Lords appears to have been correct in West-
deutsche when it was stated that extending the availability of compound 
interest on judgment awards is a matter that is best left to the legislature. 
Awarding compound interest does serve better to compensate a plaintiff. 
The unforeseen difficulties that may arise from Bank of America, how-
ever, suggest that law reform studies should have been undertaken prior 
to making such a drastic change.
However, since the Supreme Court did not think it appropriate to 
wait for legislative intervention, it could have at the very least restricted 
its analysis to compensatory principles and avoided the use of restitu-
tion principles in contract. By so doing, it could have achieved the same 
result, but without the confusion that results from its ambiguous use of 
the term “restitution.”
